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1. Introduction
Much has already been written in both the academic and popular press about the
profound transformational effect of the net on transactions costs.  Reducing trans-
actions costs, especially in the financial service sector, has always allowed transaction
volumes to increase; New York’s May Day and London’s Big Bang are simply older
examples of this very powerful trend.  However, the net has produced trends that
will be more significant than the reduction in transactions costs, and that will require
changes in the strategies of all major financial institutions.
The three trends to be described in this paper will not appear new, and indeed they
are not new.  However, although they have been observed before the widespread
adoption of the net, they have surely been accelerated by the net.  Disintermediation,
for example, has existed since the first blue chip corporations discovered that they
could issue short term commercial paper at rates more attractive than their bank
loans.  However, this bypass of financial intermediaries, once available only to firms
like General Motors or IBM, is  now available to micro-breweries placing their first
public round of equity, or to individual who do not wish to pay brokerage fees.
In this paper we address the three trends that we feel will have the greatest strategic
significance.  Although none was created by the net, each has been accelerated by
the net; moreover, while each was once largely reserved for commercial financial
services the net has accelerated the movement of each from commercial domains to
retail and consumer services.  Importantly, their full strategic impacts have yet to be
experienced, and neither financial services firms nor their regulators seem fully
aware of their implications.
In this paper we address the following:
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• Price transparency
• Differential pricing
• Bypass and disintermediation
1.1. Transparency
Transparency reflects the degree to which market participants have access to informa-
tion on pricing, both before and after trades, order sizes (before resulting in trades)
and trade sizes (after execution).  As was rapidly clear after London’s Big Bang,
transparency dramatically affects margins and the profitability of principal traders
(alternatively specialists in New York, broker-dealers on Nasdaq, jobbers in pre-Big
Bang London, and market makers in London today).
Prior to Big Bang, a jobber cheerfully explained his job by saying:
“I stand on the floor and people throw tuppence at me.  He wants to sell his shares to
her, but he can’t.  He sells them to me and I sell them to her.  They each pay me
tuppence.  That may not sound like much, but it’s tuppence a share, times a couple of
million shares a day, times a couple of hundred trading days a year.  God I love this
job!”
In brief, he was buying low and selling high, which worked as long as customers
were willing to buy high and sell low, which they did as long as they were not
particularly well informed.
Speaking to the same man a year after Big Bang he described his job very different-
ly:
“I buy 800,000 shares from him at 304, hoping to sell them to her at 306.  But
everyone knows I paid 304, everyone knows I have 800,000 shares, and everyone
knows I don’t want them.  I’m lucky to unwind the last of the lot at 304.”
Shortly thereafter he took early retirement and spent the next year on the coast of
Portugal.  Transparency and easy profits for market makers do not appear to be
compatible.
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1.2. Differential pricing
A wide range of financial services industries exhibit a strong customer profitability
gradient.  That is, customers are heterogeneous in a number of ways that strongly
influence profitability.  Some people have high cholesterol and do not exercise; they
are expensive to insure.  Others make extensive use of credit on their credit cards
and pay their balances off slowly; they are profitable to serve.  While price discrimina-
tion has been extensively studied in economics and marketing (c.f., Tirole), net-
based services offer the environment in which many of the most sophisticated
theories can be practically applied.
Differential pricing makes use of underlying customer differences to set prices
individually, attracting and retaining the best accounts, and in industries with
significant price elasticity actually encouraging these accounts to make more use of
profitable services.  Differential pricing has long been used by commercial insurers,
setting different prices for different fleets of vehicles, different facilities, even differ-
ent steam boilers, based on estimated risks and expected claims.  Similarly, actuarial
tables are used to develop approximate estimates of risks for life insurance, so that
premiums can be set more accurately.  These principles are being applied to indi-
vidual applicants and account holders in more industries (such as credit cards), with
increasing accuracy and precision.
As we will explore below in section 3, the need for differential pricing is heightened
by increasing price transparency.
1.3. Bypass and Disintermediation
Bypass (or disintermediation) occurs when a customer is able to interact with the
primary supplier of goods or services, without requiring the services of a previously
essential intermediary.  Bypass can be driven by and initiated by the primary service
provider, as when insurance companies attempt to deal directly with customers
online, bypassing their traditional agent intermediaries, or by the customers them-
selves, as when the best prime rate borrowers decide to issue short term commer-
cial paper rather than take loans from their traditional commercial  banks.  Other
examples include the online sale of simple insurance products like term life, online
mortgage applications, and online stock trading.
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To some extent bypass is enabled by the failure of traditional intermediaries to
engage in differential pricing.  Customers who are extremely profitable for tradi-
tional brokers to serve (for example, day traders who trade frequently and require
little or no advice from financial consultants) are most vulnerable to opportunistic
pickoff by online brokerage services.  Indeed, uniform pricing in the presence of
customer heterogeneity is one of the principal drivers of disintermediation, and as
we shall explore below disintermediation greatly increases the need for differential
pricing.
2. Price Transparency
Runaway price transparency can be viewed as the terror of the net since it leads
increasingly to brutal, Bertrand price competition.  Indeed, a quick examination of
two online vendors’ prices for popular books (figures 1 and 2), in which both are
selling the book at the publisher’s cost to them, suggests at best limited profit
opportunities.  As we mentioned above, runaway price transparency was the
principal source of pressure on market maker profitability after London’s Big Bang
(cf. Clemons and Weber for more detail).
Price transparency does not need to lead to the collapse of profits; it merely de-
mands that more complex pricing strategies be adopted, even for online merchants. 
Amazon and Barnes and Nobles do not use identical pricing strategies for all books,
nor are all books sold at their cost.  Comparison of figures 3 and 4, showing their
prices for Elizabeth Gray’s Green Sea of Heaven illustrates this clearly.  The two
merchants do not agree on their discounts.  They do not even agree on an appropri-
ate list price.  As with supermarkets, where certain benchmark products must be
priced as low as possible, online booksellers seem to have adopted everyday low
pricing for best sellers; again, as with supermarkets, these same merchants appear
to have adopted a mixed, high-low strategy, decreasing comparability and price
transparency, in order to retain some profitability.
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Figure 1 — Amazon.com’s web screen for a best selling novel,
Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Askaban
Impacts of the Internet on Financial Services: Version 2.0 // 6 February 2001
Transparency, Differential Pricing and Disintermediation Page 7
Figure 2 — BN.com’s web screen for a best selling novel,
Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Askaban.
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Figure 3 — Amazon.com’s website screen for a less widely read book, 
Elizabeth T. Gray’s Green Sea of Heaven.
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Figure 4 — BN.com’s website screen for a less widely rad book, 
Elizabeth T. Gray’s Green Sea of Heaven.
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The net also enables forms of path dependent strategies.  When customers shop for
cell phone service, wireless service companies will often offer attractive discount
packages to new accounts.  However, if the same customer first buys an expensive,
state of the art new phone, with service available from only one carrier, this carrier
no longer has any incentive to offer a discount; if the customer clicks through
directly from the cell phone vendor to the wireless service provider, none of the
discounted packages will be offered.
Path dependent strategies are simply one, simple form of differential pricing, based
upon the information endowment of the seller.  Indeed, differential pricing is the
most important element of pricing strategies, for financial service providers as well
as providers of other goods and services, and will be explored in the next section.
3. Differential Pricing
Differential pricing has a long and established history:
• based upon differences in cost to serve among different customers (e.g.,
some brokerage customers need more support and more service than
others; some insurance policy holders have higher risk profiles than
others; some corporate and individual consumer borrowers have higher
risk profiles than others)
• based upon differences in expected revenues and profits among different
customers (some customers at hotels use the bar, the restaurants, the
golf courses more than others, leading to ancillary spending in excess of
their room rates; some hotel guests in Las Vegas and Atlantic City
gamble extensively and, indeed, receive complimentary rooms in expecta-
tions of profits to be made elsewhere during their stays)
• based upon differences in willingness to pay among different customers
(business travelers are frequently willing to pay far more than leisure
travelers for the same flight)
Impacts of the Internet on Financial Services: Version 2.0 // 6 February 2001
Transparency, Differential Pricing and Disintermediation Page 11
3.1. Defense of Differential Pricing
More widespread awareness of differential pricing has led to increasing resentment
among customers in many industries (e.g., corporate travel, individual insurance). 
This resentment has, in turn, led to increasing regulatory interest in these practices,
and often, in the case of individual life and health insurance, to regulatory interven-
tion.  
Despite this regulatory hostility, it is not difficult to establish that differential pricing
based upon customer differences may be beneficial, even essential, to the proper
functioning of a market.  Akerlof has demonstrated that a market where customers
have a continuous distribution between two bounds, and where counterparties have
complete information asymmetry, the market collapses, with no sales being com-
pleted.  (While Akerlof’s result is dependent upon complete information asym-
metry, with only sellers being aware of the quality of their offerings, the same result
will obtain in the presence of regulatory restrictions upon information availability,
or upon its use in differential pricing.)  
With a discrete distribution the problem is slightly different.  Using the insurance
industry as an example, and assuming two separate populations differing on
expected risk to serve, in the presence of information asymmetry total market
collapse is averted.  Rather, only the highest risk customers will choose to insure,
and they will do so at the actuarially fair rate, subject to slight risk aversion.  This
result continues to hold in the presence of information asymmetry’s close cousin,
regulatory enforcement of uniform pricing.  Although the market does not collapse
fully, market participation and coverage of risk are reduced, as high risk individuals
insure and low risk individuals opt out of the market due to costs that greatly
exceed expected benefits.  Rothschild and Stiglitz have demonstrated that with a
discrete distribution even in the presence of complete information asymmetry,
product design and differential pricing can be combined so that low risk and high
risk insurance applicants self select for the degree of coverage appropriate to them,
and market participation increases.
Rothschild and Stiglitz’s results, and those of many researchers who followed them
in the insurance industry, are based on the size of the deductible, or alternatively, on
price rationing of services.  The highest risk individuals will accept full coverage, at
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the actuarially fair price for their group.  Lower risk individuals will accept a higher
deductible and only partial coverage, while the expected cost of having this partial
coverage is too great to be accepted by those who know themselves to be high risk.
Since only low risk individuals will accept the lower coverage, the price for this
group can be based upon the actuarially fair rate for them, suitably reduced because
they are receiving only partial coverage.  Thus a stable separation can be achieved,
even in the presence of information asymmetry.
Clemons and Thatcher have extended this work to reflect conditions more reflective
of those that exist in insurance markets today.  In place of partial coverage deter-
mined by the size of the deductible, Clemons and Thatcher study the impact on
market efficiency when a certain condition is excluded from insurance.  That is, if
applicants differ in their genetic predisposition to a single condition such as a form of
cancer or to diabetes, and if this information is known only to the applicant and not
to the insurance company, policies with exclusion of coverage for the specific
condition can restore market participation among low risk individuals, much as
price rationing did in the Rothschild and Stiglitz example.
Table 1 (Base Case) shows the efficient functioning of a market in the presence of
symmetric information, or, more precisely, symmetric lack of information; neither
applicants for insurance coverage nor the insurance provider is aware of the risk
status of any applicant.  This table shows full market participation, as both high risk
and low risk applicants are fully insured, and both have chosen to purchase insur-
ance at the actuarially fair rate for the entire population treated as a single group.
The following conditions are used in the simulation of this section and in all the
following simulations.  The probability of being low risk for cancer is 90%, while the
probability of being high risk is 10%.  In low risk individuals the lifetime probability
of getting cancer is 1%, while in high risk individuals it is 20%.  The lifetime proba-
bility of developing any medical condition other than cancer is 10%.  The cost of
cancer treatment averages 500 Thalers (a monetary unit used by experimental econo-
mists), while the cost of treatment for other conditions averages 100 Thalers. 
Consumers’ risk aversion is a very modest 5%.
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Base Case:  No consumer awareness of riskiness, no attempted
inference by regulators, no genetic testing and no distinctions made by
insurance company.
Results:
Consumer Decisions
% Coverage 100%
% No Coverage 0%
Insurance Company Pricing
Price of Complete Coverage Th 24.50
Summary Findings:  Under these conditions, assuming even modest
risk aversion of 2% or 3%, all consumers opt for complete coverage,
and the resulting prices are based on the actuarially correct expected
costs for the population as a whole.
Table 1—Symmetric information, with neither insurance company nor appli-
cants possessing risk evaluations for individual customers.  All individuals
choose to participate in the market.
As table 2 illustrates, the presence of private information causes some market
deterioration.  Individuals who know themselves to be high risk continue to pur-
chase insurance.  Those who know themselves to be low risk believe the price of Th
24.50 to be excessive and they begin to opt out.  As the price increases and more low
risk customers leave as a result, the market approaches a steady state in which only
high risk applicants choose to purchase insurance.  This result obtains whether
uniform pricing is a result of lack of availability to insurance providers, or regulato-
ry restrictions that prohibit its use.  It is clear that this uniform pricing benefits no
one.  Low risk customers have no insurance.  High risk customers pay their actuarial-
ly fair rate, with no benefit from their insurance company’s lack of information or
from regulatory interference with the functioning of the market.  Note that these
results continue to hold even when consumers’ information is less than fully accu-
rate.
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Asymmetric Information — Consumers have private informa-
tion:  Consumers assess their riskiness through inference and genetic
testing and use this information to guide their insurance purchase
decisions.  Insurance companies are unable to performing data mining
or to use test results.  Test is 80% accurate.
Results with only complete coverage policies available:
Consumer Decisions
Test Results High Risk Low Risk
% Complete 100% 0%
% No Coverage 0% 100%
Insurance Company Pricing
Price of Complete Coverage Th 45
Table 2—Asymmetric information, with applicants having accurate assess-
ment of their risk profiles but insurance providers having no comparable
sources of information.  Only high risk individuals continue to participate in
the market.
Table 3 shows how performance of the insurance market can be improved by the
introduction of exclusionary policies.  Insurance companies now offer two policies,
complete coverage (as the name implies) and ABC policies (all but catastrophic risk,
where catastrophic risk denotes the single attribute on which consumers have
private information on their risk profiles).  As is clear from this table, offering such
policies represents a pareto improvement; high risk individuals are no worse off than
they were under the conditions of table 2 (only a single policy type available), and
low risk individuals are better off since they are no longer fully uninsured.  How-
ever, many regulators and legislators, both in individual state governments and in
Congress, object to all exclusionary policies under the mistaken belief that they are
necessarily damaging to high risk individuals.
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Asymmetric Information — Consumers have private informa-
tion:  Consumers assess their riskiness through inference and genetic
testing and use this information to guide their insurance purchase
decisions.  Insurance companies are unable to performing data mining
or to use test results.  Test is 80% accurate.
Results with complete coverage and ABC policies available:
Consumer Decisions
Test Results High Risk Low Risk
% Complete 100% 0%
%ABC Only 0% 100%
% No Coverage 0% 0%
Insurance Company Pricing
Price of Complete Coverage Th 45
Price of ABC Coverage Th 10
Summary Findings:  When only complete coverage policies are
available, only consumers who test high risk choose to purchase in-
surance, and consumers who test low risk remain uninsured.  When
consumers can choose between complete coverage and ABC cover-
age, those who believe that they have high risk choose complete
coverage and those who believe that they are low risk choose ABC
coverage.
Table 3—Asymmetric information, with applicants having accurate assess-
ment of their risk profiles but insurance providers having no comparable
sources of information.  Insurance companies offer two different policies,
differing in their coverage of the condition for which consumers have private
information.  Coverage of risk increases.
Finally, we consider the case in which both insurance companies and applicants have
access to the same information.  Individuals can assess their risk based upon the
results of private genetic testing (assumed to be only 80% accurate) or based on
inferences available from the medical history of family members (also only partially
accurate).  Table 4 illustrates the case where both insurance companies and appli-
cants have equivalent access to this information.  Insurance companies use the
information to determine the prices they should charge each applicant for both
complete and ABC coverage, and applicants use this information and the prices
offered them to determine which policy to purchase.  As the table shows, removing
information asymmetry restores full market participation; all customers are now
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fully insured.  This comes at a social cost, however; customers are charged very
different prices, for reasons that are often based on genetic conditions and pre-
dispositions towards disease that cannot be considered in any way their fault. 
Additionally, some customers may, due to financial or budgetary constraints, be
forced out of the market if they cannot afford to pay their actuarially fair rate.  This
is the source of much consumer and regulatory resistance to differential pricing. 
However, as Clemons and Thatcher show, regulatory intervention intended to
protect the most high risk segments of the population generally fail; as can be seen
from table 2, maximizing information asymmetry by protecting the privacy of high
risk individuals does not improve the prices that they pay for insurance, but merely
serves to drive low risk individuals out of the market.
Results with complete coverage and ABC policies available:
Consumer Decisions: All consumers choose complete coverage,
regardless of their test status and regardless of their prior estimates of
their of riskiness.
Insurance Company Pricing
Price of Complete Coverage
Inference/Test
HI/HI HI/LO LO/HI LO/LO
Th 60  Th 19.9 Th 27 Th 16
Summary Findings: All consumers choose to purchase complete
coverage, but they are charged very difference prices.
Table 4—Allowing the symmetric use of information by insurance companies
and applicants restores full market participation at actuarially fair prices.
3.2. Love ‘ems, Kill Yous and Death Spiral
Data from industries as diverse as credit card, demand deposits accounts in retail
banking, cell phone and long distance telephone service, market making and stock
broking, and insurance suggest that there are extreme differences in customer
profitability.  Reports from credit card issuers suggest that prior to differential
pricing these profitability differences created a strong customer profitability gradi-
ent, where the most profitable 20% represented more than 100% of issuer profits,
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the middle 60% were in aggregate essentially break-even for issuers, and the worst
two deciles represented net losses.  No wonder that a bank that described this
problem to us coined the terms love ‘ems and kill yous to describe the best and the
worst two decile groups.  Love ‘ems represented 135% of their profits and kill yous,
as net loss makers, would kill you if you had too many of them.
Not surprisingly, the best credit card issuers and the most astute providers of a wide
range of services have begun to engage in differential pricing.  Rather than compete
to obtain as many customers as possible, using economies of scale and lower
systems development and operating costs to produce slightly better bottom line
figures, these issuers competed to capture and to retain the most profitable individu-
als, who produced the greatest revenue.   That is, rather than engage in scale-based
competition to achieve at best marginal improvements in the bottom line, they
sought to develop skill-based competition, producing correspondingly larger improve-
ments in top line and bottom line performance.  The most effective form of target-
ing the best accounts is, in general, differential pricing, or reducing prices for the
most attractive customer groups.  (An alternative form of skill-based competition,
based upon service upgrades for best accounts, or offering better service at the
same price that would normally be charged for standard service is, indeed, little
different from offering a better price on the better service, and these closely related
strategies will not be distinguished further here.)
Section 3.1. demonstrated that in the presence of pronounced differences among
customers differential pricing can be beneficial to the efficient performance of
markets.  We note here that in the presence of these differences, once one player
begins employing differential pricing, all must respond.  Simplistic pricing in the
presence of customer differences creates a customer profitability gradient and
vulnerability; anecdotal data suggests that failure to address this vulnerability can
lead to a self-reinforcing loss of profits, known as death spiral, ultimately forcing
competitors who do not respond to exit the market.
Capital One Financial is the best known of the credit card issuers that first employed
differential pricing [Clemons and Thatcher].  Their initial strategy employed the 
balance transfer product, which offered significantly more attractive interest rates to
those customers who transferred outstanding balances in from other card issuers. 
Transactors, customers who pay their balances off immediately, are usually unprofit-
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able for issuers, as they are the recipients of free credit for their charge transactions. 
In contrast, revolvers , customers who keep revolving balances but never pay them
off in full, are generally extremely profitable for their issuers, since they historically
pay rates well above the bank’s cost of capital, and well above the risk adjusted
interest rates that they would pay for traditional consumer loans.  Capital One’s
management team recognized that customers who would respond to an offer to
transfer balances into the bank in exchange for lower interest rates would predomi-
nantly be those customers who care about interest rates, which would predominant-
ly be those that pay finance charges, which in general would be those customers
most profitable for the bank.  Over time, Capital One developed sophisticated
models for assessing each customer’s expected profitability and adjusting interest
rates to achieve an optimal balance between short term profitability based on rates
and long term profitability based on customer retention and extending the lifetime
value of this customer as an annuity.  Capital One’s President, Nigel Morris, ob-
served that “any fool can lend money.  The trick is finding customers who will pay you
back, and pay you back slowly.”  Capital One’s greatest success came in using pricing as
a mechanism for attracting and retaining customers who will “pay you back slowly.
”  As a competitor noted, shortly before his bank was forced out of credit card
issuance by sustained losses, “If one of your competitors starts down this slippery slope [of
differential pricing] you have no choice but to follow suit.”
3.3. Differential Pricing when Threatened with Bypass
Just as price transparency influenced the need for differential pricing, it can be made
more critical by the threat of bypass or disintermediation, when that bypass is
targeted at attracting love ‘em customers from their established relationships with
intermediaries.
Analysis of the profitability of market makers acknowledges the differences in
customer profitability and correctly attributes this difference to different degrees of
customer information endowment.  A customer who consistently knows when a
stock price is going to change, and changes in advance of this price change, is deadly
as a counterparty for market makers, much as the house would find a gambler who
knew when the roulette wheel was going to come up red or black to be deadly in a
casino.  Most analysis of financial market structure and market maker performance
uses the powerful simplification of informed traders (i.e., those who trade with
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superior information on the correct equilibrium price of a stock, our kill yous) and
liquidity traders (i.e., those who buy stock as a long term investment, or who sell
because they need the money to pay for a major purchase such as a car, a house, or
a college education, our love ‘ems).  Market maker intermediaries charge for their
services through the bid-ask spread, which often does not vary among customers;
hence, these intermediaries lose money on their trades with informed traders, but
more than recover these losses on their trades with liquidity traders.
When possible, market makers do indeed attempt to reduce their information
asymmetry where possible, asking numerous questions to improve their own
information endowment.  Any trader sitting at his upstairs block trading desk
would immediately ask some combination of the following questions to assess his
degree of risk when accepting a trade:
• “Do you need a price now or can I work the trade and get back to you?”  (i.e.,
do you have time sensitive private information?)
• “Am I the first person you showed this block to?”  (i.e., has somebody else,
perhaps with good reason, already declined to trade this position with
you?)
• “Is this the first block, or am I seeing the tail end of a large position?”  (i.e., is
the street already flooded with these shares?)
• “Is this the last block, or are you going to be trying to place more shares while
I am still trying to work off this position?:  (.i.e., is the street about to be
flooded with these shares?)
The net, as well as other and older communications technologies, creates the possi-
bility of alternative trading venues (popularly called electronic communications
networks or ECNs).  These ECNs can be and indeed have in some instances have
been designed to appear selectively to liquidity traders, offering lower cost execu-
tion, but usually sacrificing both speed and certainty of execution.  While lower cost
appeals to all investors, the lack of speed and of certainty of execution frequently
discourages informed traders from bringing their order flow to these ECNs.  This
selective targeting of market makers’ most profitable accounts through differential
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pricing potentially can transform market making into a newly vulnerable industry,
subject to opportunistic pickoff from ECNs.
At the request of planning officers in London we conducted a study of the vulner-
ability of the London Stock Exchange to such opportunistic pickoff.  We considered
several cases, using discrete event simulation to model the dynamic behavior of the
market under each of these cases.  The models were tuned through extensive
interviews and data analysis to reflect timing of order flow, the behavior of in-
formed and liquidity traders in the presence of prices that differed from true (and
unobservable) equilibrium prices, and the behavior of market makers as their
positions became increasingly long or short.  We considered first the case where all
customers used market maker services and paid the spread.  We then examine the
increasing request for improved execution and the impact on profitability.  We
examine naive responses that are possible to market makers and their resulting
initiation of death spiral.  Finally, we describe an alternative strategy, based on
signaling mechanisms, that can preserve both the role of market makers and their
profitability.
Table 5 illustrates our base case.  All market participants trade through market
makers.  Liquidity traders do pay for their transactions (their round trip trading
costs represent approximately 1% of transaction sizes.  Informed traders make a
profit (as shown by their negative transactions cost).  Since the weighted average of
a large pool of liquidity traders and a smaller group of informed traders results in a
positive transaction cost, market makers are a group are profitable.   
BASE CASE:  All classes of trader execute using market maker services.
Market maker profits (thousands) £124.2
Transactions Cost (percent of value traded)
Liquidity traders 1.09%
Informed traders -2.40%
Weighted average 0.221%
Table 5—Base case, where all investors trade through market makers.
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The next stage of our analysis illustrates what happens when ECNs (e.g., Trade-
Point, Instinet) are made available in London.  Before these networks were widely
adopted, customers began to demand mid-spread execution from their market
makers, threatening to take their business off-exchange if these requests were not
granted.  Initially, these ECNs were attractive principally to liquidity traders, who
were the ones most likely to request mid spread execution (mids) from market
makers.  With no way to distinguish between informed and liquidity traders,
however, market makers initially granted mids equally to all who requested it.  The
only determinant is whether or not accepting the trade at mid spread would have
forced their position over their position limit, the point at which they would normal-
ly adjust their quotes, trade with other market makers, or take other actions to limit
increasing their exposure.  The sensitivity analysis shown in table 6 makes it clear
that this naive strategy is unsustainable.  If enough customers request mid spread
execution, and as informed traders begin to request it as well, market maker
profitability is effectively destroyed.  Clearly this strategy is not sustainable.
 
STAGE 1:  Market makers begin to grant midspread execution.
Mids=33% Mids=67% Mids=100%
Market maker profits (thousands) £63.6 -£13.0 -£74.6
Transactions Cost (percent of value traded)
Liquidity traders 0.957% 0.802% 0.642%
Informed traders -2.59% -2.79% -3.00%
Weighted average 0.115% -0.028% -0.146%
Middle price requests accommodated 55.2% 52.9% 51.5%
Table 6—Market maker losses develop as the use of midspread execution
increases.
Of course, market makers would not be willing to continue these loss-making
activities.  Table 7 examines what happens when market makers become more
conservative, tightening the conditions under which they trade.  They hold positions
more conservatively, more rapidly adjusting their spreads to reflect any change in
inventory positions.  Market makers are less likely to accommodate midspread
requests, but their profits do not fully recover.
Impacts of the Internet on Financial Services: Version 2.0 // 6 February 2001
Transparency, Differential Pricing and Disintermediation Page 22
STAGE 2-A:  Market makers tighten their position limits, becoming less willing to
hold positions without adjusting their quotes.  This dramatically improves market
maker profitability, but was not sufficient to restore profitability to the levels enjoyed
before midspread dealing became prevalent.
Mids=33% Mids=67% Mids=100%
Average dealer position limit 14 12 10
(was 18 in prior stage)
Market maker profits (000s)  £68.2  £14.6  -£51.7
Transactions Costs
Liquidity traders 0.963% 0.823% 0.686%
Informed traders -2.54% -2.64% -2.83%
Weighted average 0.122% 0.022% -1.04%
Middle price requests accommodated 52.2% 48.8% 46.0%
Table 7—Market makers tighten their position limits, restoring some profits
but becoming less attractive to the market they are attempting to serve.
Since even the strategies employed in table 7 were not sufficient to restore market
maker profitability, market makers now not only reduce their position limits but
stop making mids available “except when it suits,” that is, except when it moves
their position closer to zero.  Since this does improve profitability it would appear to
be an effective defensive strategy, except that it reduces the attractiveness of the
market differently to different market segments.  This is shown in table 8.  As the
percentage of mid-spread requests granted drops, self selection becomes a signifi-
cant threat to market makers.  Informed traders will continue to use the market. 
Liquidity traders will move off exchange, to one or more of the ECNs.  This trend is
shown in table 9.
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STAGE 2-B:  Market makers become more conservative, granting midspread only
for trades that move their positions closer to zero.
Mids=33% Mids=67% Mids=100%
Average dealer position limit 14 12 10
Market maker profits (000s)  £80.0  £22.5  -£39.0
Transactions Costs
Liquidity traders 0.975% 0.841% 0.730%
Informed traders -2.52% -2.65% -2.80%
Weighted average 0.144% 0.037% -0.079%
Middle price requests accommodated 47.2% 45.0% 43.2%
Table 8—Increasingly conservative strategies improves market makers’
profitability but reduces the attractiveness of the market.
STAGE 3:  Market makers accept only middle price trades that reduce their abso-
lute position size (zero-position rule).  Only 45%, 35%, and 25% of middle price
orders go to market maker initially; the rest go directly into crossing system.
Mids=33% Mids=67% Mids=100%
Market maker profits (000s)  £94.3  -£28.4  -£72.3
Transactions Costs
Liquidity traders 0.864% 0.636% 0.506%
Informed traders -2.48% -2.70% -3.41%
Weighted average 0.182% -0.056% -0.152%
Fill Rates — Mids orders accommodated
Exchange market makers 39.6% 28.5% 13.8%
Off-exchange crossing system 51.4% 49.1% 50.8%
Crossing System volume as percent of total
18.3% 40.0% 71.2%
Table 9—Increasingly conservative market maker strategies have driven
liquidity customers off exchange.  ECNs represent a significant share of the
volume and market maker profits have declined.
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Just as screening mechanisms allowed Capital One to appeal more effectively to
those customers that it sought to serve, signalling mechanisms are available to
attract and retain profitable customers in securities trading.  Liquidity traders are
attracted by the lower price; informed traders are kept away by one or more
features that result from use of the screening mechanisms, much as high risk
applicants would not apply for insurance policies that exclude coverage for their
high risk conditions, despite the lower cost.  A number of these are available and
have been reviewed in the literature.  Most are employed by ECNs or as dialogues
in face to face markets, but others are available to market makers even in screen-
based markets such as London.  Table 10 shows how the use of such a mechanism
can restore market maker profitability, even in the face of threats from ECNs and
the disintermediation they represent.
SIGNAL I:  A signaling mechanism is in place to appeal selectively to liquidity
traders.  Liquidity traders all use the signaling mechanism, informed traders do
not..
Market maker profits (000s) £123.5  
Transactions Costs
Liquidity traders 0.571%
Informed traders -0.908%
Weighted average 0.246%
Table 10—Market maker profitability restored and market share retained after
the introduction of differential pricing enabled by an effective screening
mechanism.
4. Bypass and Disintermediation
The combination of customer differences and uniform pricing has led to significant
opportunities for pick-off, employing targeting strategies based on effective use of
differential pricing to attract and retain the most attractive customers .  This has
been evident in horizontal competition, as banks, credit card issues, and insurance
companies competed for the best customers, as described in sections 3.1 and 3.2.  As
shown in section 3.3, differential pricing and targeting can also be used in vertical
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competition, enabling opportunistic pickoff that attempts to bypass an entire class of
intermediaries in the distribution channel.
Bypass of intermediaries is dependent upon a combination of factors, including:
• the ease of disintermediation, and the ease with which intermediaries’
functions can now be taken over by other channel participants, as a result
of technology, change in customer preferences, or change in regulation,
and the ease with which these channel participants can reach customers
directly
• the attractiveness of bypass, based largely upon the ability to target
customers through a skill-based strategy, reducing or eliminating the
need for massive economies of scale by new entrants; this requires both
the presence and the visibility of a customer profitability gradient
• the difficulty that established incumbents will have in countering the
new disintermediation strategy, either by matching them, or by eliminat-
ing customer profitability gradients, or by plausibly threatening effective
punishment of the new entrants’ channel strategies
4.1. Experience with Disintermediation
As Clemons and Row have demonstrated, airlines were ideally suited to engage in a
disintermediation strategy, threatening to eliminate the role of travel agents if they
did not accept significant cuts in commissions.  Commissions, consequently, have
been reduced from 10% of all tickets to the lesser of 8% or $50.00 (and sometimes
$35.00).  As their analysis shows:
• Attack was easy, because the product was readily described online, using
an extension to computerized distribution systems that already served
travel agents, and easily distributed through electronic (virtual) ticketing.
• Attack was attractive, because the profitability of business travelers was
significantly higher, due to higher average ticket prices and lower service
demands, and because frequent flyer plans made identification of fre-
quent and profitable travelers relatively straightforward.
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• Defense was difficult, because rapid adoption of alternative distribution
channels, facilitated by accurate targeting of profitable customers,
precluded plausible threats of effective retaliation by travel agents.
The effectiveness of this threatened disintermediation is made clear by the fact that it
never needed to occur.  Commissions were effectively slashed because it was
evident to all parties that agents had no alternative but to comply; the alternative
would have been direct distribution by airlines to those customers who were most
profitable and easiest to serve.  Attack by airlines would have been easy and attrac-
tive, and defense would have been difficult or impossible.
In contrast with disintermediation of travel agencies by airlines, analysis by Clem-
ons and Row predicted that consumer packaged goods would be most unlikely to
disintermediate retailers.  Their analysis was based on the same three factors as their
analysis of air travel — ease of disintermediation, attractiveness of disintermedia-
tion, and difficulty of defense.  However, these factors were seen to have very
different impacts on the two industries:
• Describing each of the tens of thousands of products present in a super-
market electronically is not easy, since the characteristics of produce are
so different from canned goods, which differ yet again from health and
beauty aids.  As importantly, many of these attributes (e.g., freshness,
color) are highly subjective.  Delivering these products in a cost effective
manner likewise requires highly complex logistics and significant econo-
mies of scope, which few online retailers have been able to achieve even
now. 
• There is at best a limited customer profitability gradient.  Individual
consumers do not pay Procter and Gamble, Campbell Soup, or Unilever
markedly different prices for identical products, and even if some con-
sumers were willing to do so this information is available only to the
retailer and not to the manufacturer.
• Large mass merchandiser intermediaries are indeed able to defend
themselves.  The first paper towel manufacturer or the first detergent
manufacturer to attempt bypass would face certain retaliation from
retailers, who would reduce promotional efforts, raise retail prices, and in
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general damage the sales prospects of offending brands.  Slow adoption
of online grocery shopping by consumers, coupled with the lack of a
visible customer profitability gradient that can be exploited, greatly
increase both the duration and the severity of punishment inflicted by
the retailer.
4.2. Disintermediation of Stock Brokerage
Analysis of bypass in stock brokerage suggests that in many ways it should behave
like air travel.  The factors analyzed — ease of disintermediation, attractiveness of
disintermediation, and difficulty of defense — once again will be the same.
• Describing an order is easy.  The customer needs to be prompted to
provide the appropriate ticker symbol, whether the order is a buy or a
sell, and the order quantity.  Other information, such as credit and
payment information, needs to be established once, when the customer
creates his or her trading account, and then can be automatically invoked
after customer authentication.  This suggests that new, online brokerage
services can readily attack established full service brokers.
• There is indeed a strong customer profitability gradient.  Self-directed
traders, of which day traders are only the most recent and most extreme
example, do not require the expensive research operations that full
service brokerage firms provide and do not need to pay for them. 
Likewise, they do not require extensive advising on stock selection or
asset allocation, and they do not need to pay brokerage fees, wrap
account fees, or other fees to account executives, financial consultants,
and brokers.  While a full service firm needs to charge significant com-
missions to cover the cost of research and of account executive services,
an online discount broker competitor can target self-directed traders and
charge much, much lower prices for routine trades.
• However, the brokers and account executives of full service firms can
indeed defend themselves if their firms attempt to respond to online
attack and disintermediation of brokerage.  Many full service investors
are more loyal to their brokers than to their brokers’ employers.  A firm
that threatens its account executives by putting in direct distribution in
Impacts of the Internet on Financial Services: Version 2.0 // 6 February 2001
Transparency, Differential Pricing and Disintermediation Page 28
response to attack from a new entrant online broker may find that it has
the worst of both worlds.  It still has high infrastructure costs, it has lost a
significant fraction of its revenue as day traders left it, and it will lose
even more revenue as its full service investors follow their account
executives away from the firm.
The implications of this analysis are shown in figures 5, 6, and 7.
Figure 5 shows the profitability of two full service firms (without loss of generality
we call them Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter) under attack by a new
entrant that offers inexpensive online trading services to self-directed investors.  Full
service firms have expensive infrastructure and pay commissions to their brokers
and account executives; the high brokerage fees that they charge customers cover
commissions, variable trading costs (settlement and clearing), and the fixed infra-
structure of the firm.  Online discount brokers, offering fewer services, have greatly
reduced research and infrastructure expenses, and can charge far lower trading fees.
As full service brokers lose more self-directed traders, their revenues decline much
more rapidly than their expenses, most of which are fixed.  Profitability rapidly
declines.
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Figure 5 — Rapid decline in profitability of full service brokerage firms as many
self directed investors move their trades to online discount brokers.  Although
revenues decrease sharply at these full service firms, their high infrastructure
costs and costs of research do not decline. 
Figure 6 shows why effective response is difficult.  Whichever full service brokerage
firm first responds to the threat of online discount services runs the risk of alienating
its own account executives, provoking at least some of them to leave the firm;
moreover, at least some of those who leave the firm will have customers who
follow them and bring their trading accounts with them. 
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Figure 6 — Profits of the first full service firm that launches online discount
brokerage services decline even more rapidly than before, as many of their best
account executives leave for other firms, and as many full service customers
follow their trusted brokers, while competitor’s performance improves.
Figure 7 shows that when both full service firms defensively introduce online
trading services, as indeed they would, further attrition to new purely online
discount brokers is averted.  Financial performance of both firms is affected equi-
valently, as both follow the same strategy.  But both are damaged.  This cannot be
considered surprising:  the loss of revenue (either to competitors’ discount services
or your own), without corresponding reduction in infrastructure expense (such as
proprietary research needed for full service customers) must reduce profitability.
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Figure 7 — If both full service brokerage firms introduce online discount trading
services, their profits decline as these services cannibalize some of their existing
business.  However, losses are slower than if they fail to respond and continue to
lose business to new entrant firms offering only online discount brokerage.
Analysis of agents in the insurance industry would produce very different results. 
While there are numerous sources of these differences, principal is the difference in
speed with which customers can be attracted to online insurance sales.  While most
stock brokerage customers in some sense start the day “in play,” with each trade a
separate opportunity to earn, must insurance customers do not start the day in play.
Property and casualty insurance policy holders are interested in insurance only
when their policies are due to be renewed, and life insurance policy holders frequentl-
y do not consider changing policies once they have made their first purchase.  In
contrast, most insurance sales agents start each day with a strong interest in insur-
ance sales.  Thus, the retaliation of insurance agents against any companies that
launched online sales would be much more rapid than the rate at which customers
could be expected to adopt online sales, greatly complicating formulation of online
sales and marketing strategy for traditional P&C insurers and issuers of term life
insurance.
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5. Strategic Implications
These three trends — price transparency, differential pricing, and bypass — will
have significant strategic impacts of many if not all financial services firms.
For industries with simple products, price transparency will create acute pressure on
pricing.  Any service provider that does not offer a customer the best price for
specific goods and services in these industries is likely to lose that customer.  Credit
cards and demand deposit banking products are the most obvious examples, but
term life, brokerage services, market making services, and many other aspects of
financial services are being added to this list.  This price pressure will require some
form of pricing strategy, especially since there will be few opportunities to over-
charge a customer for prices that were too low, either for that customer or another. 
Since losses from pricing mistakes will be irrecoverable, and since opportunistic
pickoff means that customers will be lost to lower price service providers, this
implies a careful combination of cost containment and informed differential pricing.
The need for differential pricing will be even more  acute in industries with strong
customer differences in profitability, because opportunistic pickoff will be even
more attractive.  Cross subsidizing unprofitable kill you accounts by overcharging
love ‘ems will not be sustainable when love ‘ems are targeted by numerous compet-
itors.  Indeed, cross subsidies of any form will be difficult to sustain in the presence
of net-based shopping.  An example from an unrelated industry makes this quite
clear.  A golf pro will often charge a higher price for golf clubs but provide a free
fitting to assure that club length, shaft stiffness, grip size, and club head angle all fit
perfectly; the pro may then find that customers take this fitting information and
then buy clubs more cheaply over the net.  Many golf pros have responded by
charging separately for the fitting but then offering clubs at the same discounted
prices available over the net, effectively unbundling the price of fitting from the
price of the clubs.  Similarly, this unbundling of services may drive financial service
firms to unbundle their pricing, charging separately for research and for access to
trading services.
Just as bundling of pricing for different services creates vulnerability for golf pros
selling clubs, for industries with strong differences in customers’ needs for service
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there will need to for different prices, or for unbundled prices, to avert the threat of
disintermediation.
